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persons other than the witness.30 It is better that a witness testify to what he saw
and not to what another saw. If the other person's evidence is of value, he
may himself be called as a witness, and in this way the jury may see and hear
from actual experience and observe the witness's reactions as he is being sub-
jected to cross-examination. Thus the jury may determine his credibility for
themselves and weigh his testimony accordingly.
One exception to the hearsay rule is the "res gestae" rule40 which allows
the introduction of unsworn statements into evidence if such statements are a
spontaneous and natural utterance.41 The necessity for the declaration to be spon-
taneous and natural is to eliminate any chance of fabrication.
42
In the instant case,43 the Court of Appeals held a witness could testify about
a statement made by a deceased truck driver concerning the condition of the
brakes on a truck. The witness rode alongside deceased and heard him de-
clare, just ten seconds before the accident: "The brakes do not work." Plaintiff
was injured in the accident, and her allegation that the accident was caused by
defective brakes was supported by this statement, and made out a prima facie
case.
There is no doubt that statements made by one person and testified to by
another are hearsay declarations and should be excluded, but a too rigid applica-
tion of the hearsay rule might eliminate the only possible evidence in a case and
thus bar many rightful and just claims. This case presents a classic example of
a claim that would have been barred but for the res gestae rule.
Admission of Evidence-Hospital Records
A memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event is
admissible in evidence if the trial court finds that it was made in the regular
coure of any business and that it was the regular course of such business to make
such memorandum or record.44 This exception to the usual rules of evidence
requiring confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses rests upon the proba-
bility of trustworthiness, inherent in routine entries made by the person whose
business involves the keeping of such records in its regular course and whose in-
39. Carrier v. Arrow Exterminating Co., 201 Misc. 786, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 603
(1951).
40. 1 WHARTON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §279 (12th ed. 1955).
41. People v. Del Vermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 85 N.E. 690 (1908); People v. Curtis,
225 N.Y. 519, 122 N.E. 623 (1919).
42. Greener v. General Elec. Co., 209 N.Y. 135, 102 N.E. 527 (1913).
43. Swensson v. New York, Albany Despatch Co., 309 N.Y. 497, 131 N.E. 2d
902 (1956).
44. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT, §374-a.
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terest lies in having them truthful, accurate and reliable.45 Williams v. Alexander,46
a case of first impression in New York, concerned the scope to be given to the
phrase "regular course of business" with respect to entries in hospital records.
The majority opinion adopted a narrow construction of the phrase, holding
that the entry in a hospital record must relate to diagnosis, prognosis or treat-
ment and that anything not germane to such purpose failed to satisfy the under-
lying rationale of section 374-a. This result was found to be in harmony with
the decisions of almost all other states, construing comparable statutes. 47 Where
the particulars of an accident had no medical significance, it could not be said
that entries were made in the regular course of a hospital's business, and there-
fore they failed to support the probability of trustworthiness. 48  Since the Court
was unable to find that the portions of the hospital record, improperly admitted,
had not influenced the jury's verdict for defendant, it remanded the case for a
new trial.
Three dissenters contended that section 37 4 -a was not in issue, but rather
that the case concerned an admission against interest, an exception of the hearsay
rule,49 proved by a record, the accuracy of which had been vouched for by the
plaintiff. Since the plaintiff had introduced the record to prove the extent of
his injury, the dissent felt that it was an unnecessary and undesirable construction to
deny the defendant's use of the same record to show an admission against in-
terest. The dissent then looked to section 374-a, holding that the terms of the
statute are broad and leave to the trial court the discretion in ascertaining
whether the entires were made in the regular course of business, a discretion
which should not be curtailed by an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation.
Despite the persuasive discussion by Judge Desmond in dissent, it would
seem that the majority position in preventing extension of this exception to an
important evidentiary rule was fully justified. To allow the introduction in evi-
dence of hospital record entries other than those dealing with diagnosis, prognosis
or treatment would be to invite persons injured to make broad statements con-
cerning the cause of the accident for the single purpose of later using them in
a law action.
45. Jonsohn v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 128, 170 N.E. 517, 518 (1930).
46. 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E. 2d 417 (1955).
47. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §290, p. 611 (1954); RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE §233,
pp. 209-212 (8th ed., 1955).
48. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1707, p. 36 (3d ed. 1940).
49. Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899).
